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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff and Appellee, : Case No. 950560-CA 
v. : 
TRAVIS E. TELFORD, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant and Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his conviction for murder, a first degree felony. Utah Code 
Ann. §76-5-203 (1996). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-
2a-3(2)(j) (1996) (pourover from the Utah Supreme Court, R. 243). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err when it denied defendant's motion to suppress 
contents of three letters he wrote from Box Elder County Jail? An appellate court 
reviews the factual findings underlying the denial of a motion to suppress under a 
clearly erroneous standard, and reviews the trial court's conclusions of law based on 
those facts for correctness. State v. Trover. 910 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1995) (citations 
omitted). In addition, this Court considers the facts in a light most favorable to the trial 
court's ruling. LL (citing P_ena, 869 at 935-36). 
2. Were defendant's right to confrontation and his right against self-
incrimination violated by the trial court's admission of his redacted confession, 
and a limitation on defendant's cross-examination of the witness who presented the 
redacted statement? A trial court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed for clear abuse of 
discretion. State v. Kinross, 906 P.2d 320 (Utah App. 1995) (citing State v. Pena. 869 
P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994); State v. Iorg. 801 P.2d 938, 939 (Utah App. 1990). 
3. If defendant had been tried separately and his confession had not been 
redacted, is it reasonably likely that he would have been acquitted? On review, an 
appellate court reverses a denial of a motion to sever only if the appellant affirmatively 
shows that his or her right to a fair trial has been impaired. State v. Jaimez. 817 P.2d 
822, 825 (Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. Velarde. 734 P.2d 440, 445 & n.10 (Utah 
1986)). In Velarde, the Utah Supreme Court analogized this standard of review to 
Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a), which holds that any error which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded. The court emphasized that substantial 
rights are affected only when, absent the error, there would have been a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result. I$L 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Constitution, Amendment IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Constitution, Amendment V: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or the indictment of a Grand 
Jury . . . ; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived or life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . . 
U.S. Constitution, Amendment VI: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . . 
U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1: 
No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . . 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law. 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 12: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, to testify in his own behalf . . . to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him. . . . The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself . . . . 
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Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 14: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the person or thing to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202 (1996): 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the 
commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, 
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to 
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable 
as a party for such conduct. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-8a-l(2)(b) (1996): 
Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or 
information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or 
conduct or in the same criminal episode. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-8a-l(2)(d) (1996): 
When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, 
they shall be tried jointly unless the court in its discretion on motion or 
otherwise orders separate trials consistent with the interests of justice. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-8a-l(4)(a) (1996): 
If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a 
joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a 
joinder for trial together, the court shall order an election of separate 
trials of separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, ir provide other 
relief as justice requires. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-8a-l(4)(b) (1996): 
A defendant's right to severance of offenses or defendants is 
waived if the motion is not made at least five days before trial. In ruling 
on a motion by defendant for severance, the court may order the 
prosecutor to disclose any statements made by the defendants which he 
intends to introduce in evidence at the trial. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in an information with murder, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1996) (R. 1-2). He was tried jointly with a 
codefendant, Brandon A. Dahlquist, and both were convicted in a jury trial (R. 216). 
Defendant was sentenced to five years to life, with a consecutive firearm enhancement 
of one to five years, and $23,072.00 restitution ($6,500.00 of which is joint and several 
with the codefendant) (R. 231-32). Defendant timely appealed his conviction (R. 231-
37). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it are 
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 
1205-06 (Utah 1993). 
The murder victim, Troy Weston, had repeatedly "burned" drug users in the 
Riverdale-Ogden area by selling them drugs he had diluted (R. 1161-62, 1196-97). 
One such drug user told the codefendants, themselves drug users (R. 2138, 2146-47), 
that "there had to be something done to" Weston (R. 1161). About a week before the 
murder, the codefendants confronted the victim during a party and "beat him up" (R. 
1162-69). 
At about 9:00 a.m. on the morning of the murder, the codefendants drove to 
Weston's Riverdale home where they spoke briefly with the victim (R. 1238-41). The 
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codefendants were driving in a Chevrolet Blazer that belonged to codefendant 
Dahlquist's father (R. 1424-26). The codefendants returned in the Blazer to the 
victim's home at about 10:00 a.m. and the victim went with them (R. 1242-44). 
Later that morning, defendant's sister saw the three near Godfather's Pizza in 
Ogden, where codefendant Dahlquist was working under the hood of the Blazer (R. 
1448-51; 1454-55; 1499-1500). The three left Godfather's in the Blazer at about 11:15 
to 11:30 a.m. (R. 1328). 
Between 11:30 and noon, an Air Force captain, saw three men in the Blazer at 
the murder scene in the south Willard Bay area, which is about a twenty to thirty 
minute drive from the Godfather's Pizza in Ogden (R. 1283-86, 1290-91, 1293-94, 
1309, 1558). Based on what he later saw and heard from about 200 yards away, and 
based on his experience with firearms, it initially appeared to the witness that the three 
men were shooting at targets with a .22 caliber, semiautomatic pistol (R. 1288-95). A 
few minutes later, the witness heard shots and a scream, and saw two men run, get in 
the Blazer, and speed from the scene. I$L The victim was found dead in a ditch near 
where the Blazer had been parked (R. 923-68, 974-79, 1047-48; State's Exhibit 5). He 
had been shot eight times with a .22 semiautomatic pistol which was never recovered 
(R. 1562, 1572, 1591-92, 1597-98, 1778). Defendant admitted in a letter from jail that 
he had destroyed the murder weapon (R. 1763). Some live .22 rounds, matching shell 
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casings at the murder scene, were found in defendant's vehicle (R. 1066, 1097-98, 
1776-77; State's Exhibit 39). 
Around 12:00 noon on the day of the murder, the codefendants dropped off the 
Blazer to have it painted at a location about twenty to thirty minutes from the murder 
scene (R. 1344-51, 1775-76, 1820, 1824-25). Defendant paid for the paint job (R. 
1350). 
A Chips Ahoy cookie box, set up as a target at the murder scene, had 
defendant's fingerprint on it and matched the lid found in the Blazer a few days after 
the murder (R. 978-79, 1051, 1067-68, 1513, 1101-02; State's Exhibits 23 and 33). 
Defendant admitted buying the box of cookies on the morning of the murder (R. 1777). 
At issue under Point I. Excerpts from letters defendant sent to friends from jail 
after his arrest were read to the jury: 
I'm sorry truly. But the death of Troy has been hanging on my mind, 
driving me crazy. I am going to tell the police the truth. If I don't I get 
life. Actually the death penalty will probably be imposed. I have a very 
guilty conscience. I will take the rap for destroying the gun. . . . I'm 
sorry, but there is no other way. 
(R. 1763; State's Exhibit 37A). 
The next part of this letter I hope you don't hold against me because I lied 
to you and everybody else but please keep it quiet until after court. I 
hope you and everyone else will forgive me for lying to you and to them, 
but I was scared. I didn't want to admit to being there. As a friend 
please don't tell anyone. I will do that when I get out. And please 
forgive me for lying to you. If word gets out that I was there it could put 
me in prison for life. I'll do it myself in a couple of weeks when I'm 
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free. I'm sorry to tell you and have you keep it a secret, but I have to tell 
someone. I'm going crazy knowing this and not being able to tell anyone 
and that is the reason I didn't want to go to the funeral. But please don't 
tell anyone and I will be forever in your debt. Thinking of you a lot, 
Travis. 
(R. 1764; State's Exhibit 37A). 
Nicole, I'm sitting here again. It's about 4:30 a.m. I woke up having the 
nightmare about Troy's death. How I was sitting there discussing if he 
wanted to buy the gun how he would pay for it. I bet I still have skid 
marks in my pants that I was wearing. You never know, though, they 
might still try to press it on me. Just because I held out on telling them 
what they need to know. Maybe if I just die I won't have to. But if I do 
that then my daughter will be without a father. Thinking of you a lot. 
P.S., send me Jimmy's address. 
(R. 1764-65; State's Exhibit 37A). (Defendant makes no claim that he was prejudiced 
by the excerpt of these statements.) 
At issue under Points II and III. A redacted version of defendant's pretrial 
confession to Detective Hansen was also read to the jury. The purpose of the redaction 
was to remove all references to the codefendant who claimed he was elsewhere at the 
time of the murder. This is the redacted version (as used in this brief, "redacted 
confession" refers to this April 14, 1994 statement to Detective David Hansen): 
On April 14th, 1994, while enroute to Box Elder County jail with 
prisoner Travis Telford, he told me about the day of the homicide of Troy 
Weston. Since his arrest he's attempted numerous times to tell me of the 
incident. Each time he's attempted to tell me I would inform him that he 
had secured an attorney and must have his permission to talk to me about 
the incident. 
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About 4:15 while on 1-15 enroute to the jail, Travis, without being 
asked, started to talk about the homicide of Troy Weston. He said that 
Troy had inquired about buying a gun because he had some people who 
wanted to hurt him. He said he went and picked up Troy Weston at his 
house and headed out to Willard to show him the gun. 
He said that when he and Troy arrived out in Willard out came a 
small automatic .22 caliber handgun. He said that they had parked on the 
side of the road to shoot. They then got out and went over to shoot the 
gun and Troy asked how did it work. Travis said that when Troy asked if 
it worked, he was shot in the shoulder. He said Troy screamed and said 
what are you doing. Troy then was shot again. This time twice in the 
back, because Troy's body had then shifted sideways. 
He then said Troy continued to tell to stop it. He then said that one 
of the bullets must have hit Troy's spine because he quit moving and just 
dropped to the ground. Troy was then shot again twice more in the front 
and the gun jammed. He said it either jammed or ran out of ammunition. 
Travis went back to the Blazer and got another clip. When he got back to 
the Blazer the new clip was loaded and the gun was placed under Troy's 
chin and the trigger pulled one last time. He then said Troy did not move 
any more and he dragged the body about 30 feet to the ditch. He then got 
back to the Blazer and sped back to Ogden. 
(R. 1409-10). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court did not err when it denied defendant's motion to suppress 
contents of three letters he wrote from Box Elder County Jail since defendant had 
no legitimate expectation of privacy in his nonprivileged, outgoing mail. Defendant 
claims that admitting excerpts of three letters he wrote from jail violated his 
constitutional right to privacy. Defendant had neither a subjective nor a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the three letters in question which he provided to jailers in 
unsealed envelopes. Prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy, and prison 
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officials do not violate the constitution when they read and copy inmates' 
nonprivileged, outgoing mail. 
2. Defendant's right against self-incrimination and right to confront 
witnesses were not violated by the trial court's admission of his redacted 
confession, or by a limitation on defendant's cross-examination of the witness who 
presented the redacted confession. Defendant argues that the unredacted confession 
was exculpatory, that admission of the redacted statement violated his right against self-
incrimination because it forced him to testify about what was redacted, and that limiting 
his cross-examination of Detective Hansen violated his confrontation right and 
precluded him from eliciting testimony that would have been exculpatory. 
Defendant's assertions are unsupported by the record. Defendant has made no 
valid proffer of exculpatory evidence he was prevented from presenting in his defense. 
Defendant's decision not to testify both establishes that his right against self-
incrimination was not violated, and belies his claim that his testimony would have been 
exculpatory. 
Defendant had a right to confront the witnesses against him, and his counsel 
cross-examined Detective Hansen at length. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion 
when he limited the scope of that cross-examination to matters related to the witness's 
direct examination. 
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3. If defendant had been tried separately and his confession to Detective 
Hansen had not been redacted, it is not reasonably likely that he would have been 
acquitted. Defendant argues that the trial court's denial of his severance motion 
denied him a fair trial. Defendant's confession that he was present during the murder, 
got another clip to load in the gun after the victim had already been shot, dragged the 
body into a ditch, and destroyed the murder weapon would be sufficient to convict him 
as a party to the murder had he been tried separately. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT DENIED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS CONTENTS OF THRFE 
LETTERS HE WROTE FROM BOX ELDER COUNTY JAIL 
SINCE DEFENDANT HAD NO LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF 
PRIVACY IN HIS NONPRIVTLEGED, OUTGOING MAIL 
Defendant claims that admitting excerpts of three letters he wrote from jail 
violated his constitutional right to privacy (Def. Br. at 12). While defendant concedes 
that he was on notice that his mail would be scanned before being sent, he argues that 
he was not on notice that his mail could be copied and forwarded to the county 
attorney's office (LL). Defendant argues a distinction without a difference. His 
argument concedes that he had no expectation of privacy in the challenged letters. 
While in Box Elder County Jail awaiting trial, defendant wrote several letters 
(S££, Sa&u, State's Exhibits 35 and 36). Jail personnel copied some of them and 
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forwarded the copies to the prosecutor (R. 331). Defendant made a written motion 
before trial to suppress these letters, arguing that their admission would violate his 
constitutional rights (R. 93-95, 97, 103-08). The trial court denied the motion (R. 153, 
375), and excerpts from the letters were read to the jury (R. 1763-65; State's Exhibit 
37A). 
This court reviews the factual findings underlying the denial of a motion to 
suppress under a clearly erroneous standard, and reviews the trial court's conclusions 
of law based on those facts for correctness. State v. Trover. 910 P.2d 1182 (Utah 
1995) (citations omitted). In addition, this Court considers the facts in a light most 
favorable to the trial court's ruling. LL (citing Pena. 869 at 935-36). 
The Box Elder County Jail outgoing mail procedure is important to put 
defendant's claim in context. It states: 
a. The jail staff will pick up the outgoing mail at the service of the 
noon meal and head count. 
b. Outgoing mail will abide by the following rules: 
(1) Envelopes will not be sealed, except for privileged 
correspondence to attorneys or the judicial [sic]. Each letter 
will contain a complete return address on it. Mail failing to 
meet this criteria will be returned to the inmate. 
(2) The Staff member picking up the mail will take it to 
the jail booking office where it will be inspected and 
scanned during the afternoon and night duty watch. 
Upon completion, the letters will be sealed. . . . 
(R. 143; emphasis supplied). 
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Defendant claims that copying the three letters before they were sent violated his 
"constitutional right to privacy" (Def. Br. at 12). The two-part "legitimate expectation 
of privacy" test is well established. First, a defendant must demonstrate that he or she 
had a subjective expectation of privacy in the object searched. Second, a defendant 
must demonstrate that this expectation was one that society views as reasonable. State 
v. Kolster. 869 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v. Scott, 860 P.2d 1005, 
1007; State v. Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 915 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Taylor. 818 
P.2d 561, 565 (Utah App. 1991). Defendant fails on both counts. 
A. No subjective expectation. First, defendant concedes he was aware that jail 
personnel were inspecting and scanning his mail before it was being sent (R. 104; Def. 
Br. at 16). In fact, in keeping with jail policy (R. 143), defendant provided the three 
letters in question in unsealed envelopes to State authorities for the very purpose of 
allowing them to inspect the letters. This conduct establishes that defendant had no 
subjective expectation of privacy in the contents of those letters. See State v. Webb. 
790 P.2d 65 (Utah App. 1990) (a legitimate expectation of privacy requires first that 
the defendant "exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy"). 
Defendant attempts to draw a distinction between notice that his mail would be 
screened and notice that it would be copied and forwarded to the prosecutor in his case 
(Def. Br. at 16). But since defendant knew in the first instance that his letters were not 
private, this distinction is meaningless. See Kolster. 869 P.2d at 995 ("we look to 
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how defendants manifest their expectations regarding the object searched to determine 
their subjective privacy interest"). 
B. No reasonable expectation. Second, whatever expectations of privacy 
defendant had in his mail, they are not those that society views as reasonable. In his 
pretrial motion and in his brief, defendant has cited only cases that support the right of 
jailers to examine outgoing mail (R. 103-06; Def. Br. at 15-20). In fact, during the 
hearing on the suppression motion, defense counsel conceded, "it's true I was not able 
to find any cases that explicitly stated or explicitly supported my contention concerning 
the letters" (R. 372). Indeed, case authority is expressly contrary to defendant's 
position. 
In Hudson v. Palmer. 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3202 (1984), the Supreme Court held that 
"prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy, and . . .the Fourth Amendment's 
prohibition on unreasonable searches does not apply in prison cells . . . ." £ f State v. 
Velasquez. 672 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983) (unlike either prisoners or law-abiding citizens, 
parolees have a "diminished expectation of privacy" when it comes to warrantless 
searches and seizures). 
In United States v. Wtelen, 940 F.2d 1027, 1035 (7th Cir.), cert.denied. 112 
S.Ct. 403 (1991), the Seventh Circuit specifically held that because of reasonable 
concern for prison security, "prison officials do not violate the constitution when they 
read inmates' outgoing letters." (quoting United States v. Brown. 878 F.2d 222, 225 
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inmate's attorney. See State v. Shimp. 562 F.2d 423, 425 (7th Cir. 1977) (interest of 
state in monitoring no/iprivileged correspondence justifies minor burden placed on 
freedom to communicate with friends and relatives). But that is not the situation here. 
In United States v. Kelton, 791 F.2d 101 (8th Cir.), cert-denied, 479 U.S. 989 
(1986), the Eighth Circuit specifically rejected the contention that regulations 
authorizing prison officials to read and copy non-privileged mail violate inmate's 
Fourth Amendment rights. 
Finally, defendant's citation of cases dealing with censorship of prison mail and 
implicating the First Amendment are inapposite since he has made no showing either 
that the letters he wrote were censored, or that they were not delivered to the intended 
recipients. Sfi£, £ ^ , Treffv. Galetka. 74 F.3d 191 (10th Cir. 1996) ("A refusal to 
process any mail from a prisoner impermissibly interferes with the addressee's First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights"). 
In sum, both on factual and legal grounds, defendant had no expectation of 
privacy in the letters he sent from jail. No constitutional right was violated, and 
defendant's argument is without merit. 
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Point II 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND 
HIS RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES WERE NOT 
VIOLATED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S ADMISSION OF HIS 
REDACTED CONFESSION, OR BY A LIMITATION ON 
DEFENDANT'S CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DETECTIVE 
HANSEN 
Defendant argues that admission of the redacted confession violated his right 
against self-incrimination because it forced him to testify, and that limiting his cross-
examination of Detective Hansen violated his confrontation right and precluded him 
from eliciting testimony that would have been exculpatory (Def. Br. at 20-39).' 
Defendant's assertions are unsupported by the record. Further, defendant's 
decision not to testify both establishes that his right against self-incrimination was not 
violated, and belies his claim that his testimony would have been exculpatory. Finally, 
defendant's counsel cross-examined Detective Hansen at length. The trial judge did not 
abuse his discretion when he limited the scope of that cross-examination to matters 
related to defendant, as opposed to codefendant. 
A. No proffer of exculpatory evidence. In response to codefendant's severance 
motion, the trial court required the redaction of all of defendant's statements to 
eliminate any reference to codefendant (R. 546), and gave a limiting instruction that the 
statements could only be considered against defendant (R. 1168, 1408, 1422-23, 1763-
1
 These arguments are found under both Points II and III of defendant's brief, 
and are consolidated here. 
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1764, 1765). The rationale was that admitting such references through Detective 
Hansen would deny codefendant's right to cross-examine the declarant. See 
Richardson v. Marsh. 481 U.S. (1987). Defendant's assertions that his unredacted 
confession contained exculpatory evidence, and that he was precluded from presenting 
other exculpatory evidence, are unsupported by the record. The record does not 
establish that the redactions from defendant's confession, defendant's testimony, or 
Detective Hansen's cross-examination would have exculpated defendant in any degree. 
Defendant proffered no such evidence, including the unredacted confession, to the trial 
court to establish a record for appeal. 
An appellate court "will not set aside a verdict because of the erroneous 
exclusion of evidence unless a proffer of evidence appears of record, and [the Court] 
believe[s] that the excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial influence in 
bringing about a different verdict." State v. Arguelles. 921 P.2d 439, 445 (Utah 1996) 
(quoting State v. Ramme] 721 P.2d 498, 499-500 (Utah 1986); §££ also. Hill v. Hartog. 
658 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Utah 1983); Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(2). 
In State v. Christofferson. 793 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah App. 1990), this Court held 
that, "[w]hen raising objections on appeal, appellant has the burden to see that the 
record contains the materials necessary to support his appeal." An appellate court 
"'cannot speculate on the existence of facts that do not appear in the record. When 
crucial matters are not included in the record, the missing portions are presumed to 
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support the action of the trial court.'" I$L (quoting State v. Theison. 709 P.2d 307, 309 
(Utah 1985); see alSQ Intermountain Power Agency v. Bowers-Irons Recreation Land & 
Cattle Co.. 786 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (in the absence of a complete 
record, we presume that the trial court's findings are supported by sufficient 
evidence)); State v. Cantu. 750 P.2d 591, n.7 (Utah 1988) ("Defendant has the burden 
to preserve his points on appeal by making an adequate record below"). 
Defendant's counsel suggested during closing argument that defendant was under 
duress during the murder (see R. 2279, line 3; R. 2280, lines 15-16). Duress, or 
compulsion, is an affirmative defense. Utah Code Ann. 76-2-302 (1996). In State v. 
Ott. 763 P.2d 810, 812 (Utah App. 1988), this Court rejected a defendant's claim of 
duress in a prosecution for theft because the defendant "failed to demonstrate specific 
imminent threats and . . . that there were no reasonable legal alternatives to committing 
the crime." (Citing State v. Tuttle. 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986)). Defendant has likewise 
failed to demonstrate "specific imminent threats" in this case. 
Defendant had at least two opportunities to make such an express proffer during 
trial. During discussions about the redaction of defendant's statement to Detective 
Hansen, and with the unredacted statement before him, the trial court responded to 
defendant's objections, noting 
[U]nder the law, and under the instructions that the jury will receive on 
accomplices, if the statement came in with no redactions, it is in essence a 
confession anyway. If the jury finds, as a matter of fact, that defendant 
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Telford went to the vehicle, got more ammunition, brought the clip back 
so that the shooting, or execution at that point, could be completed, then 
he has in effect confessed to being part and parcel of that crime. 
(R. 880). Instead of arguing that the unredacted statement, or any other preferred 
evidence, supported a duress defense, defendant's trial counsel responded, "That's 
correct. . . ." LL2 
Later, after his statement to Detective Hansen had been redacted, defendant 
argued that it was misleading since it gave "the impression that he confessed to the 
murder" (R. 1397). The prosecutor responded, "[Defendant] did confess to murder 
because he confessed to being an accomplice" I$L The prosecutor then noted that 
defendant had admitted getting the extra clip during the murder to finish off the victim, 
and destroying the murder weapon. I$L (Defendant also admitted, in the redacted 
statement, to disposing of the body, R. 1409-1410). Significantly, defendant neither 
objected to the prosecutor's characterization, nor argued that the unredacted statement, 
which was before the court, supported a duress defense. I*L 
By order dated January 15, 1997, this Court truck defendant's fictionalized 
"unredacted confession" from his brief. As of the filing of this brief, defendant has not 
moved to supplement the record on appeal with the actual statement, pursuant to rule 
11, Utah R. App. P. Absent any information in the record establishing that the 
2
 Counsel also argued that defendant might be guilty of a lesser included offense 
of murder. 
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redacted portions of defendant's confession, defendant's testimony, or Detective 
Hansen's cross-examination would have been exculpated him in any way, defendant's 
claims are completely unsupported. Since defendant has provided no basis on which to 
address the merits of his claims, this Court should decline to consider them. See 
Argwlles, 921 P.2d at 445; United States v, Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 590 (10th Cir. 
1984) (appellate court in severance case held, "We will not find prejudice based on 
mere conjecture"). 
B. No violation of the right against self-incrimination. Defendant argues that 
the redactions from his pretrial confession forced him to testify (although he ultimately 
chose not to). If he had testified, defendant asserts, his testimony would have been 
exculpatory and resulted in his acquittal (Def. Br. at 35-36). Defendant nevertheless 
refuses to proffer what his testimony might have been (see A. above). 
Defendant's "prospective" argument is without merit: he was not, in fact, 
compelled to testify, and he has not, in fact, provided any evidence to this Court that 
his testimony would have been exculpatory. Hence, defendant improperly attempts to 
use his Fifth Amendment protection not as a shield, but as a sword. State v. Maguire. 
529 P.2d 421 (Utah 1974) ("what was given to him generally as a shield should not be 
used as a sword"). 
Criminal defendants have both a constitutional right to testify in their own 
behalf, and a right against self-incrimination. Utah Constitution, article I, section 12; 
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Rock v. Arkansas. 107 S.Ct. 2704 (1987); U.S. Constitution, amend. IV; see also Utah 
Code Ann. §77-l-6(l)(c) ("In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled . . . to 
testify in his own behalf . . . ."). Either right may be waived. See, e.g.. State v. 
BlQQk&, 833 P.2d 362 (Utah App. 1992); Miranda v. Arizona. 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). 
Defendant chose to waive his right to testify. By that choice, he chose not to waive his 
right against self-incrimination. 
It is clear defendant decided before trial that he would not testify. In a pretrial 
hearing held March 28, 1995, defendant so advised the trial court saying that he 
believed he could get what he needed for his defense out of his pretrial statements that 
the State intended to offer (R. 528-29).3 Defendant's decision to waive his right to 
testify, therefore, even after the redacted confession was admitted, belies his current 
claim that his testimony would have been exculpatory. Indeed, defendant's decision not 
to testify safeguarded his right against self'-incrimination.* 
Defendant's situation was no different from any criminal defendant faced with 
the introduction of incriminating evidence, including the defendant's own pretrial 
3
 In his closing argument, defendant suggested a duress defense based on 
"reasonable inferences" (see R. 2279, line 3; R. 2280, lines 15-16). However, 
codefendant's counsel was correct when he argued that *[t]here is no evidence in the 
record" that codefendant threatened defendant to participate in the murder (R. 2295). 
4
 Defendant has made no suggestion that his pretrial statement to Detective 
Hansen was involuntary or violated his right against self-incrimination. It was 
obviously admitted under Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2) as an admission of a party-opponent. 
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admissions. £fi£ Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2). "'Introduction of any evidence, direct or 
circumstantial, tending to implicate the defendant in the alleged crime, increases the 
pressure on him to testify. The mere massing of evidence against a defendant cannot 
be regarded as a violation of his privilege against self-incrimination/" State v. Smith. 
726 P.2d 1232, 1236 (Utah 1986) (quoting Barnes v. United States. 93 S.Ct. 2357, 
2363 (1973)). 
Since defendant chose not to testify, it is a tautology to say that he cannot 
establish that he was compelled to testify. Neither has he established that admission of 
his redacted statement otherwise violated his right against self-incrimination.5 See 
National Treasury Employees Union v. U.S. Department of the Treasury. 25 F.3d 237 
(5th Cir. 1994) (standing in Fifth Amendment cases will fall generally into two 
categories: first, where a plaintiff remains silent and is then subjected to some sanction 
or penalty for refusing to testify; second, where a plaintiff has refrained from invoking 
the privilege, given an incriminating statement, and then seeks to bar the use of the 
statement in a later criminal proceeding—either on the ground that the statement was 
coerced, or on the related ground that the witness's ostensible waiver of the privilege 
against self-incrimination was not knowing and voluntary). 
C. No violation of the right to confront a witness. Defendant argues that the 
trial court "effectively restricted [him] from engaging in any meaningful cross-
5
 Sfi£ n.4 above. 
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examination" of Detective Hansen because he was restricted from asking questions 
about codefendant's involvement in the murder (Def. Br. at 36). 
Under the Sixth Amendment, defendant had a right to confront the witnesses 
against him, and his counsel cross-examined Detective Hansen at length (R. 1410-
1422). The trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he limited the scope of that 
cross-examination to the substance of the witness's direct testimony, and to matters 
related to defendant, as opposed to matters involving the codefendant. 
In connection with his ruling on codefendant's severance motion, which resulted 
in redaction of defendant's confession, and in relation to defendant's cross-examination 
of Detective Hansen, the trial court ruled that defendant would "not be allowed to ask 
any questions that will make reference to [codefendant]" and could "not ask any 
questions that would attempt to elicit what has been redacted" (R. 548). 
"The essence of the confrontation right is the opportunity to have the accusing 
witness in court and subject to cross examination, so that bias and credibility can be 
evaluated by the finder of fac.." State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353 (Utah 1986). The 
confrontation right is not absolute, and the trial court has discretion in limiting the 
scope and extent of cross-examination. State v. Hygh. 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) 
(citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)); Utah R. Evid. 610(b) 
("Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination 
and matters affecting the credibility of the witness"). 
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Since defendant was himself the source of the redacted statement read to the jury 
by Detective Hansen (R. 1407-1410), his cross-examination of Detective Hansen, 
which occupies 12 pages of trial transcript, appropriately dealt with the circumstances 
of the taking and transmission of the statement (R. 1410-1422). As already noted, 
defendant has neither challenged the voluntariness of his statement to Detective Hansen 
(see n.4 above), nor did he proffer to the trial court exculpatory evidence he purports 
he could have elicited during his cross-examination of Detective Hansen (s££ A. 
above). Therefore, defendant has not established a violation of his confrontation right, 
how he was prejudiced, or why the trial court's restriction on the scope of this cross-
examination was an abuse of discretion. 
In sum, since defendant failed to proffer to the trial court exculpatory evidence 
he now claims he was prevented from presenting, this Court should decline to consider 
his claims. In any event, defendant's right against self-incrimination was not violated 
because he chose not to take the stand to explain his incriminating pretrial statements. 
And, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it restricted the scope of 
defendant's cross-examination of Detective Hansen on matters relevant to his direct 
testimony. 
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Point HI 
IF DEFENDANT HAD BEEN TRIED SEPARATELY AND HIS 
CONFESSION TO DETECTIVE HANSEN HAD NOT BEEN 
REDACTED, IT IS NOT REASONABLY LIKELY THAT HE 
WOULD HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED 
Defendant argues that the trial court's denial of his severance motion denied him 
a fair trial (Def. Br. at 20-31). He specifically argues that his defense was antagonistic 
to and irreconcilable with codefendant's, and that a more favorable outcome was 
reasonably likely had he been tried separately (Def. Br. at 24-31). 
While codefendant made and renewed several motions for severance, defendant 
made a single motion to sever on March 28, 1995 (R. 529-30), which the trial court 
denied (R. 546). Defendant renewed his motion to sever after jury selection on the first 
day of trial (April 3, 1995; R. 775-82), and the trial court referred to its prior ruling 
denying the original motion (R. 782). 
An appellate court reverses a denial of a motion to sever only if the appellant 
affirmatively shows that his or her right to a fair trial has been impaired. Jaimez. 817 
P.2d at 825; Velarde. 734 P.2d at 445 & n.10. The test is whether, absent the error, 
there would have been a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result. Id. 
A. Antagonistic defenses. Defendant argues that the codefendants' defenses 
were antagonistic and irreconcilable, since codefendant's defense was alibi, and 
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defendant's defense was that he was "only a witness at best, a coerced participant at 
worst", and that codefendant committed the murder (Def. Br. at 23-27). 
The Utah Supreme Court has written, "[antagonistic defenses alone are not 
sufficient to require a separate trial. The test of whether antagonistic defenses by two 
defendants require severance is whether the conflict in the co-defendants' respective 
positions at trial was of such a nature that, considering all the evidence in the case, the 
defendants were denied a fair trial." State v. O'Brien. 721 P.2d 896, 898-99 (Utah 
1986). In other words, a defendant must show that harm or prejudice resulted by the 
denial of severance. IJL at 899. Therefore, the general test for severance also applies 
where there is a claim of antagonistic defenses: if there had been separate trials, is 
there a reasonable likelihood that defendant would have been acquitted? Velarde. 734 
P.2dat445&n.l0. 
Just as he has never established that he was, in fact, aa coerced participant" 
(Def. Br. at 29) in the murder (see II.A. above), defendant has failed to establish how 
codefendant's alibi defense prejudiced him. Indeed, the arguments from trial that 
defendant cites in his brief are codefendant's arguments about how he could be 
prejudiced from a joint trial with defendant, not the other way around (see Def. Br. at 
24-25). That codefendant's alibi defense could be undermined by defendant's 
confession that he "went to Willard Bay with the victim and codefendant, and that he 
witnessed the murder, but that it was the codefendant. . . who actually committed the 
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murder" (Def. Br. at 23), may have some merit. But whether it was codefendant or 
someone else pulling the trigger at the murder scene, defendant's confession established 
his own criminal liability as a party to the murder. 
Defendant's own corroborated admissions about getting the victim to the murder 
scene, that he was present during the murder (R. 1409-1410; R. 1764; State's Exhibit 
37A), got another clip to load in the gun after the victim had already been shot (Id.), 
dragged the body into a ditch (Id.), and destroyed the murder weapon (R. 1763; State's 
Exhibit 37A), would be sufficient to convict defendant as a party to the murder whether 
or not he had been tried separately. In other words, given defendant's admissions, it is 
not reasonably likely that, if he had been tried separately, he would have been 
acquitted. 
B. Party liability. The State referred to the accomplice instruction and to party 
liability in its opening statement (R. 821-22). Based on the evidence presented and the 
State's closing argument, it was clearly the State's theory that codefendant committed 
the murder and defendant was guilty as a party (s££ R. 2249-2251). The party liability 
statute states: 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the 
commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, 
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to 
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable 
as a party for such conduct. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202 (1996). 
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1. Mental state required: intent to kill. Defendant argued during closing that his 
retrieval of the extra clip of ammunition to provide to codefendant did not cause the 
victim's death since, before the final bullet was fired under the victim's chin, he was 
"either dead or very close to it" (R. 2279). 
However, defendant's participation in the murder didn't begin at the end. It 
began with the motive he shared to "do something" to the victim because the victim 
was selling diluted drugs (R. 1161-62, 1196-97, 2138, 2146-47). It continued when he 
and codefendant picked up the victim at his house and drove to the murder scene at 
Willard Bay. Defendant's participation continued as he stood by and watched 
codefendant fire a clipful of shots into the victim. Defendant's actions in going back to 
the truck to get more bullets, since the victim was still moving, revealed that defendant 
had not simply been a witness, but shared codefendant's intent to kill. Indeed, 
defendant's confession revealed that the victim didn't stop moving until the final shot 
was fired (R. 1410: "[Defendant] went back to the Blazer and got another clip. . . . 
[T]he new clip was loaded and the gun was placed under Troy's chin and the trigger 
pulled one last time. [Defendant] then said Troy did not move any more . . . . " ) . 
The mental state required for murder is an intent to kill. £fi£ Utah Code Ann. 
§76-5-203(l)(a) (1996). Therefore, for defendant to be convicted as a party to murder, 
he had to act with the intent to kill when he aided another to engage in conduct which 
constituted murder. It is clear that defendant's act did not have to cause the victim's 
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death. One who encourages or aids another in committing a crime may be convicted of 
that crime even though he did not personally commit it. State v. Johnson. 745 P.2d 
452, 455 (Utah 1987): see Codianna v. Morris. 660 P.2d 1101, 1108 (Utah 1983). 
That is the essence of the party liability statute. 
In State v. Wood. 868 P.2d 70 (Utah 1993), a first degree murder case, the 
defendant argued that the evidence did not establish that he caused the victim's death or 
that he acted knowingly and intentionally. Although he conceded that he was present 
during the fatal beating, Wood argued that there was no evidence he struck the fatal 
blow or intended that the victim be killed. Specifically, Wood asserted that any blow 
he struck during the beating was not life threatening. The Utah Supreme Court held 
that "[t]he blow did not have to be life threatening. It is enough that [the defendant] 
kicked [the victim] in the jaw and was otherwise cooperating with Archuleta while 
Archuleta was viciously beating [the victim] with a tire iron and a jack in the fatal 
encounter. Clearly, the jury could find that what Wood did, he did knowingly and with 
the intent that Church be killed, even if Wood's role was secondary to that of 
Archuleta." I$Lat88. 
Such is the case here. Defendant was not simply an idle bystander or witness 
who chanced upon the murder. Although secondary to codefendant's actions, 
defendant's actions in helping get the victim to the murder scene and cooperating in the 
fatal encounter, including getting more ammunition, disposing of the body, and 
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destroying the murder weapon, are sufficient to demonstrate that defendant shared the 
intent to kill. 
2. Intentionally aid. Although defendant has suggested that he was under duress 
during the murder (Def. Br. at 29; R. 2279, line 3; R. 2280, lines 15-16), the record 
on appeal contains no evidence of duress ($££ II. A. above). It does, however, contain 
ample evidence that defendant intentionally aided the codefendant in committing the 
murder: 
Defendant and the codefendant picked up the victim and drove him to the murder 
scene at Willard Bay (R. 1409). 
Defendant stood by as codefendant fired a clip of bullets into the victim (R. 
1409-1410). 
Defendant then left the wounded victim, went to the truck, and instead of 
escaping or leaving the murder scene to summon help, returned with additional 
ammunition (R. 1410). (Live .22 rounds, matching shell casings at the murder scene, 
were later found in defendant's vehicle - R. 1066, 1097-98, 1776-77; State's Exhibit 
39). 
Defendant provided that ammunition to codefendant, the person who had actually 
been pulling the trigger. I$L 
After the final shot, when the victim stopped moving, defendant dragged the 
body into a ditch. I$L 
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And defendant destroyed the murder weapon (R. 1763). 
Defendant's subsequent statements also demonstrate his consciousness of guilt 
for the murder, not remorse that he was forced to participate: 
I'm sorry truly. But the death of Troy has been hanging on my mind, 
driving me crazy. I am going to tell the police the truth. If I don't I get 
life. Actually the death penalty will probably be imposed. I have a very 
guilty conscience. . . . 
(R. 1763; State's Exhibit 37A). 
. . . I hope you and everyone else will forgive me for lying to you and to 
them, but I was scared. . . . If word gets out that I was there it could put 
me in prison for life. . . . 
(R. 1764; State's Exhibit 37A). 
. . . I'm sitting here again. It's about 4:30 a.m. I woke up having the 
nightmare about Troy's death. How I was sitting there discussing if he 
wanted to buy the gun how he would pay for it. I bet I still have skid 
marks in my pants that I was wearing. You never know, though, they 
might still try to press it on me. Just because I held out on telling them 
what they need to know. Maybe if I just die I won't have to. . . . 
(R. 1764-65; State's Exhibit 37A). 
Defendant asserted he was "going to tell the police the truth" (R. 1763; State's 
Exhibit 37A). Why didn't that (or, for that matter, hasn't that) included the fact that he 
was under duress when he participated in the murder? Why would defendant assume 
he was going to "get life" or that "the death penalty will probably be imposed" (Id.)? 
Why would he have "a very guilty conscience" if he were not an active participant in 
the murder (MJ? 
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Why would defendant initially lie about being at the murder scene (R. 1764; 
State's Exhibit 37A)? And, when he disclosed that he was there, why wouldn't he 
attempt to reduce his culpability by asserting that he had been under duress? 
Finally, if he were innocent, why would defendant contemplate death rather than 
face the charges (R. 1765; State's Exhibit 37A)? 
The simple answer to all these rhetorical questions is that defendant's actions and 
statements clearly establish that he intentionally aided in the victim's murder and 
expected to be held criminally liable. His expectation is fully supported by law: 
because he shared the intent to kill, and because he intentionally aided in the murder of 
Troy Weston, defendant was properly convicted as a party to his murder. Utah Code 
Ann. §76-2-202 (1996). There is no reasonable likelihood that, had he been tried 
separately, he would have been acquitted. Jaimez. 817 P.2d at 825; Velarde. 734 P.2d 
at 445 & n. 10. Therefore, the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to sever should 
not be disturbed. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
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